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Abstract At the time we wrote this chapter, we undertook the almost impossible 
task of providing a legal analysis of an event (Brexit) that had not happened and 
might never have happened. This chapter nonetheless contributes to the edited col-
lection in that it reports on the then legal position in the UK, and presents an analy-
sis of two possible immediate post-Brexit legal futures, for data protection law as 
applicable to biobanking in the UK. These post-Brexit futures are the position if the 
draft Withdrawal Agreement is ratified and comes into force, and the position if it 
does not (a so-called ‘No Deal’ Brexit). The chapter concludes with some thoughts 
on possible longer term futures. The main message is the deep uncertainties sur-
rounding Brexit and what it means in both legal form and in practice.
1  Introduction
At the time we finished writing this chapter (June 2019), the UK remained a Member 
State of the European Union (EU). This chapter explores the landscape of biobank-
ing in the UK and the legal framework applicable to biobanks operating in the UK, 
focussing on the applicable data protection legislation. At that time, there was much 
uncertainty around Brexit, as a Withdrawal Agreement had not yet been ratified and 
it was possible that the UK would leave the EU without an agreement, a so-called 
‘No Deal’ Brexit. It was also still possible that the UK would not in fact leave the 
EU. Given this uncertainty, this chapter outlines two possible post-Brexit legal 
futures. One of these (the UK leaving the EU without a Withdrawal Agreement) has 
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not come to pass. However, many of the uncertainties associated with it remain, 
including in the context at which this chapter is now revised (June 2020), of the 
negotiation of the future EU-UK trade relationship. The chapter primarily focuses 
on applicable data protection law in this context. 
The chapter first describes the context of biobanking in the UK, showing the 
European and global networks within which the UK’s biobanks of various types are 
embedded (Sect. 2). It outlines the key legal and governance instruments applicable 
to UK-based biobanks. The chapter then turns to the general political and legal con-
text following the EU referendum vote (Sect. 3), before its detailed discussion of 
implications of Brexit for biobanking (Sect. 4). A brief conclusion notes the effects 
of continued uncertainty on UK biobanking and medical research.
2  Biobanking in the UK: The Current Position
2.1  The Context: National Biobanks Within European 
and Global Networks
A biobank is an entity which collects and stores human biological materials, and 
data about such materials, organises them on the basis of population, disease type or 
other pertinent typology, and provides bio specimens and data for both exploratory 
research and clinical trials.1 There are five main models for biobanks (small scale/
university, governmental/institutional, population, commercial and virtual), four of 
which are present in the UK.2 A 2017 list, populated by the University of Nottingham, 
UCL and the Advanced Data Analysis Centre, covers over 180 UK-based biobanks.3
The first biobanks began over a century ago, on a small scale, within universities. 
Many ‘Russell Group’ UK Universities4 still hold smaller scale biobanks, but these 
are increasingly networked globally. For instance, University College London holds 
several biobanks focussed on specific conditions.5 Another example is London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine’s biobank for Myalgic Encephalomyelitis 
(ME)/Chronic Fatigue Syndrome.6 A third is CNMD Biobank, London, which 
collects tissues and primary cell cultures from skin, muscle, stem cells and nerve 
cells from patients with genetically determined neuromuscular diseases.7 Like other 
university biobanks, it works collaboratively, on primary and translational research, 
1 Geneticist (31 May 2018) https://www.geneticistinc.com/blog/the-importance-of- 
biorepositories.
2 The UK does not have a population biobank.
3 Tissue Directory and Coordination Centre https://biobankinguk.org/biobanks-a-z/.
4 The UK’s 24 leading universities, https://russellgroup.ac.uk.
5 UCL Human Tissue Biobanks (last updated February 2019) https://www.ucl.ac.uk/human-tissue/
hta-biobanks.
6 London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, CureME https://cureme.lshtm.ac.uk/.
7 Queen Square Centre For Neuromuscular Diseases, Biobank https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cnmd/
research/research-core-activities/biobank.
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with the European Network Eurobiobank and the EU Network of Excellence 
TREAT-NMD.
A major institutional/governmental repository, the UK Biobank, was established 
as a not-for-profit charity in 2006,8 as a collaboration between the medical charita-
ble sector, the English National Health Service (NHS), and governments within the 
UK.9 It provides services to researchers worldwide. Its website description states:10
UK Biobank is a major national and international health resource, and a registered charity 
in its own right, with the aim of improving the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of a wide 
range of serious and life-threatening illnesses – including cancer, heart diseases, stroke, 
diabetes, arthritis, osteoporosis, eye disorders, depression and forms of dementia. UK 
Biobank recruited 500,000 people aged between 40-69 years in 2006-2010 from across the 
country to take part in this project. They have undergone measures, provided blood, urine 
and saliva samples for future analysis, detailed information about themselves and agreed to 
have their health followed. Over many years this will build into a powerful resource to help 
scientists discover why some people develop particular diseases and others do not.
Another significant biobank in the UK is Oxford Biobank. Oxford Biobank holds 
a ‘collection of 30-50 year old healthy men and women living in Oxfordshire. All 
participants have undergone a detailed examination at a screening visit, donated 
DNA and given informed consent to be re-approached.’11 Oxford Biobank is an 
interesting example of protection of research participants’ rights, as they utilise a 
dynamic consent platform, which enables participants to have more control over 
how their data and samples are used and allows for the withdrawal of consent.12
Many UK-based biobanks have been and are involved in international collabora-
tions, often with partners in the EU. For example, EPIC-Oxford is the Oxford based 
‘component of European Prospective Investigation into Cancer and Nutrition 
(EPIC)—a prospective cohort of 65,000 men and women living in the UK, many of 
whom are vegetarian.’13 This project ‘is the largest detailed study of diet and health 
ever undertaken’14 and involves 23 centres from 10 European countries, including 
collaborators from the UK, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Greece, Spain, 
Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands.15 Several UK biobanks also participated in 
BIOSHARE-EU (Biobank Standardisation and Harmonisation for Research 
Excellence in the European Union), which has now ended. This included UK 
8 Naomi et  al. (2012), pp.  123–126 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S2211883712000597.
9 The Welcome Trust medical charity, Medical Research Council, Department of Health, Scottish 
Government, the Northwest Regional Development Agency, the Welsh Government, British Heart 
Foundation, Cancer Research UK and Diabetes UK, see http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/
about-biobank-uk/.
10 UK Biobank, About UK Biobank http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about-biobank-uk/.
11 Oxford Biobank https://www.oxfordbiobank.org.uk.
12 Teare and Kaye (2018), p. S3.
13 EPIC-Oxford (2019) Homepage http://www.epic-oxford.org.
14 EPIC-Oxford (2019) Introduction http://www.epic-oxford.org/introduction/.
15 EPIC-Oxford (2019) European Collaboration http://www.epic-oxford.org/europe/.
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Biobank and EPIC-Oxford.16 Currently, both UK Biobank and Oxford Biobank 
continue to make their resources available to researchers based outside the UK.
The UK Clinical Research Collaboration’s Tissue Directory and Coordination 
Centre, administered by the Medical Research Council, is a virtual biobank: an elec-
tronic web-based collection of information about existing biospecimens and data. The 
Centre does not hold any human material and is independent from physical biobanks, 
allowing it to adopt a position of neutrality. It holds the UK’s first pan-disease Tissue 
Directory,17 which is available for any research to search according to disease classifi-
cation, age, sex, sample type, preservation details, quality indicators and datasets 
available. In April 2017, it covered 100 bioresources.18 Its aim is to support research 
by enhancing the ability of researchers and organisations to find suitable samples. The 
Centre is the UK node of the BBMRI-ERIC network,19 which is an EU-funded net-
work of biobanks and biomolecular resources.20 The UK was not a founding member 
of BBMRI-ERIC, but joined subsequently. 14 EU Member States and Norway are 
members; four other states are observers. Member States, third countries as well as 
intergovernmental organisations may become members of BBMRI-ERIC at any time, 
subject to approval by the Assembly of Members according to Article 11(8)(b) of its 
Statutes.21 Members of BBMRI-ERIC take collective decisions through the Assembly 
of Members.22 Both members and observers contribute to the budget.
Due to increasing funding pressures, there may also be collaboration and invest-
ment in public biobanks by private entities.23 There are also commercial biobanks in 
the UK including, for instance, bioDock, a trading name of Future Health 
Technologies Ltd (Company number: 04431145), which is a Nottingham-based 
cryo-genetic facility, with storage facilities in Switzerland and the UK.24 This bio-
bank currently holds more than ‘500,000 samples from over 80 different coun-
tries’.25 In the commercial context, businesses that offer direct-to-consumer genetic 
tests (sometimes called ‘personal genomics’) also can be viewed as operating bio-
banks, in that they develop databases from consumers’ samples and personal data. 
Such businesses also operate across borders.
16 BioSHaRE (2015) Biobank Standardisation and Harmonisation for Research Excellence in the 
European Union (Summary Report) http://www.bioshare.eu/assets/Final%20publishable%20sum-
mary%20-%20update%20Jan.pdf.
17 Tissue Directory and Coordination Centre https://directory.biobankinguk.org.
18 Quinlan et al. (2017), p. 6.
19 Mayrhofer et al. (2016), pp. 379–384.
20 See Council Regulation (EC) No 723/2009 of 25 June 2009 on the Community legal framework 
for a European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC) amended by Council Regulation (EU) 
No 1261/2013 of 2 December 2013 OJ 2009 L 206/1.
21 The Statutes of BBMRI-ERIC were decided for implementation by the European Commission 
on 22 November 2013, published in the Official Journal of the EU on the 30 November and came 
into force on 3 December 2013 (2013/701/EU). OJ 2013 L 326/56.
22 Statutes, Article 9 (3).
23 Caulfield et al. (2014), pp. 94–110.
24 BioDock (2019) Homepage http://www.bio-dock.com.
25 BioDock (2019) Homepage http://www.bio-dock.com.
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2.2  Overview of the Current Law and Governance 
Arrangements for Biobanks in the UK
Several pieces of UK legislation have relevance to the governance of biobanks in the 
UK. The focus in this chapter is primarily on data protection. The key current legal 
instrument here is the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),26 which 
replaced the earlier Data Protection Directive.27 Some UK-based biobanks appar-
ently take the view that legal changes brought in by the GDPR do not affect the 
lawfulness of their existing practices. For instance, UK Biobank’s guidance for 
researchers states that compliance with the previous data protection regime is suf-
ficient to secure GDPR compliance.28 This statement has not, to our knowledge, 
been legally tested.
As a Regulation, from the point of view of EU law, the GDPR is ‘directly appli-
cable’ in the Member States,29 which means it has legal effect irrespective of any act 
of transposition. From the point of view of UK law, under the European Communities 
Act 1972, section  2, the GDPR takes effect in UK law in accordance with the 
requirements of EU law. Those requirements include the supremacy of EU law, in 
that the GDPR must be applied in preference to any contradictory domestic law, 
which should be ‘disapplied’ irrespective of its date of enactment (in other words, 
the normal lex posteriori rule is inverted).30 In practice, however, domestic courts in 
the UK seek to avoid any ‘clash’ of norms, but rather to interpret and apply UK Acts 
of Parliament consistently with EU obligations.31
In principle, the GDPR protects the fundamental rights of natural persons whose 
data are ‘processed’ within the material scope of EU law,32 where the entity process-
ing the data is within the EU, or the data subjects are within the EU, if the entity 
processing the data is not, and the processing activities are ‘related to the offering of 
goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required’.33 
Thus the GDPR applies in principle to all UK-based biobanks, which must comply 
with the GDPR’s terms on lawful data processing.34 The GDPR also provides for the 
26 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 
OJ 2016 L 119/1.
27 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data OJ 1995 L 281/31.
28 UK Biobank, Researchers https://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/scientists-3/.
29 Article 288 TFEU.
30 Factortame Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport [1991] 1 AC 603.
31 Hervey and Sheldon (2011), pp. 327–375.
32 GDPR, Article 2 (2) (a).
33 GDPR, Article 3.
34 GDPR, Articles 6 ff.
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free movement of data both within and into the EU. It does so by providing harmon-
ised minimum level standards of data protection, by requiring Member States to 
have a ‘supervisory authority’ to oversee their application,35 and by setting up insti-
tutional fora within which EU Member States cooperate. The UK is currently 
obliged to participate in those institutional arrangements. Its supervisory authority 
is the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO).
The GDPR permits Member States to derogate from its terms in various respects. 
The UK’s Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) both implements the GDPR in domestic 
law and specifies how the UK takes advantage of this permission. The DPA also 
outlines how various aspects of the GDPR apply in practice in the UK.36
The Human Tissue Act 2004 (HTA), enforced by the Human Tissue Authority, is 
also significant for UK biobanks. The HTA’s purpose is to regulate activities involv-
ing the removal, storage, use and disposal of human tissue. The Human Tissue 
Authority also secures compliance with the EU’s human tissue and cells Directives.37 
Under the HTA, like under the GDPR, the fundamental principle of consent under-
pins the lawful removal, storage and use of body parts, organs and tissue.38 The HTA 
provides that analysis of DNA without qualifying consent is a criminal offence.39 
Although the HTA does not specifically define the term biobank, biobanks in the 
UK come within its remit, as they typically involve the collection of a broad range 
of human biological materials.40 The Human Tissue Authority provides licences to 
organisations that collect and remove human tissue used in research and is thus 
responsible for licensing biobanks.41
Under the guidance issued by the Human Tissue Authority, UK-based biobanks 
which provide direct-to-consumer services are also obliged to comply with the pro-
visions of the HTA, which means that all such businesses should obtain consent for 
the initial performance of a genetic test.42 The law—in particular relevant 
35 GDPR, Article 51.
36 See section 22 of the Data Protection Act 2018: Section 22 (1) The GDPR applies to the process-
ing of personal data to which this Chapter applies but as if its Articles were part of an Act extending 
to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. (2) Chapter 2 of this Part applies for the 
purposes of the applied GDPR as it applies for the purposes of the GDPR.
37 Directive (2004/23/EC) which provides the framework legislation and two technical directives 
(2006/17/EC and 2006/86/EC), which provide the detailed requirements.
38 Human Tissue Authority, ‘Human Tissue Act 2004’ https://www.hta.gov.uk/policies/
human-tissue-act-2004.
39 Human Tissue Act 2004, section 45.
40 This is similar to the position in Estonia, please see K Pormeister’s chapter in this volume. K 
Pormeister, Article 89 GDPR implementation and biobanks in Estonia in Santa Slokenberga, Olga 
Tzortzatou and Jane Reichel (eds), Individual rights, public interest and biobank research. Article 
89 GDPR and European legal responses (forthcoming Springer Law, Governance and Technology 
Series).
41 Human Tissue Authority, Guide for the general public to Code of Practice E (HTA (07e/17)) 
https://www.hta.gov.uk/sites/default/files/HTA%20%2807e-17%29%206%20Research.pdf.
42 Human Tissue Authority (2019) Analysis of DNA under the HT Act FAQs, https://www.hta.gov.
uk/faqs/analysis-dna-under-ht-act-faqs, note: that the Human Tissue Authority has not altered its 
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 exemptions—will apply differently to such enterprises from its application to public 
research projects, as the nature of their business differs significantly, involving the 
direct sale of genetic tests as consumer services, followed often by secondary 
research on the genetic data generated from such tests. Furthermore, the commer-
cial nature of these businesses means that, as well as data protection law, consumer 
protection legislation, including the medical devices legislative framework also 
applies to governance of the industry and their research activities.
In addition to the legislative framework, biobanks in the UK are subject to a 
range of governance provision. Much of this concerns ethical practice. For example, 
UK Biobank’s funders developed an Ethics and Governance Framework, as well as 
an Ethics and Governance Council, which is an independent body that oversees the 
biobank’s compliance with the Framework. UK Biobank has been licensed by the 
Human Tissue Authority, which means that researchers using data or samples from 
the biobank do not need additional licences.
Finally, in addition to those under the GDPR, DPA and HTA, the common law 
may afford other protections to data subjects, concerning special categories of per-
sonal data. Such special categories include: ‘data concerning health’; genetic and 
genomic data; and ‘biometric data that is processed to uniquely identify a natural 
person’.43 These are all relevant categories for UK-based biobanks. For instance, 
claims in contract, the tort of negligence, or in equity could all be applicable in 
English law where biomedical research activities involve processing special catego-
ries of data collected from patients.44 We do not discuss these further in this chapter.
2.3  Lawfulness of Processing, Transfer of Data Within the EU, 
and Transfer to ‘Third Countries’ in the Context 
of Biobanking in the UK
2.3.1  Lawfulness of Processing and the UK Biobank
To understand how the GDPR impacts in practice on biobanking in the UK, UK 
Biobank provides a useful illustrative example. According to its website, there are 
two main grounds for lawfully processing data in this context. These are either con-
sent or legitimate public interest.45 The HRA guidance does note though that, if it is 
possible to undertake the relevant research without processing personal data, then 
position on this.
43 See Taylor et  al. (2018), p.  639 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00439-018-1921-0; Health Research 
Authority Legal basis for processing data https://www.hra.nhs.uk/planning-and-improving-
research/policies-standards-legislation/data-protection-and-information-governance/gdpr-
detailed-guidance/legal-basis-processing-data/.
44 Health Research Authority Legal basis for processing data (n 43).
45 UK Biobank (2019) GDPR https://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/gdpr/; also see their guidance docu-
ment, UK Biobank (30 May 2018a) Information notice for UK Biobank participants: the General 
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neither consent nor legitimate interest will be valid as a basis for data processing.46 
UK Biobank believes that their work meets both the consent and legitimate interests 
bases for processing. Its GDPR Information Notice asserts that:
Each person who joined UK Biobank provided their explicit consent for us to collect, store 
and make available information about them (including data from genetic and other assays 
of the samples that were collected) for health-related research, and for their health to be 
followed 25 over many years through medical and other health-related records, as well as 
by being re-contacted by UK Biobank.47
UK Biobank also states that they believe that they meet the three step tests neces-
sary for legitimate interest processing, set out in the GDPR, that is the purpose test, 
the necessity tests, and the balancing tests. Its Information Notice adds an additional 
note, stating that:
there is a further requirement under the GDPR for processing “special categories of data” 
and this includes data concerning an individual’s health. This requirement can be satisfied 
if the processing is necessary “for reasons of public interest in the area of public health of 
for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes ….”. 
The GDPR specifies that “research purposes” include “studies conducted in the public 
interest in the area of public health”. We consider that UK Biobank’s activities fall squarely 
within this requirement.48
Where data is lawfully processed within the EU, it may be lawfully transferred 
anywhere within the EU. This is one of the key aims of the GDPR, to allow the 
flow of data within the EU’s ‘single market’. UK-based biobanks, like UK Biobank, 
that transfer data out to other EU countries, and other EU countries that transfer 
data in to the UK, currently rely on these provisions. Further, under the GDPR, 
standard contractual clauses provide a lawful basis for transfer of data to ‘third 
countries’ (i.e. non-EU countries), or international organisations.
2.3.2  Consent as a Basis for Lawful Processing
In general, the GDPR sets a high standard for consent to process personal data and 
especially specific kinds of data, including health data. This raised concerns during 
its drafting that this standard could cause difficulties for researchers, as it was com-
mon practice for consent to participate in research to be framed on a broad basis.49 
This is a matter which Member States may treat differently in their derogations, but 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/
GDPR.pdf.
46 Health Research Authority (last updated 19 April 2019) Consent in research. (NHS) https://www.
hra.nhs.uk/planning-and-improving-research/policies-standards-legislation/data-protection-and-
information-governance/gdpr-guidance/what-law-says/consent-research/.
47 UK Biobank (27 February 2018b) GDPR Information Notice. https://www.ukbiobank.ac.
uk/2018/02/gdpr/.
48 Ibid.
49 Taylor et al. (2018), pp. 638–639.
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in the UK there is some uncertainty about whether consent can be relied upon as a 
basis for lawful processing in the context of health and social care research, which 
obviously includes activities of biobanks. Although consent is central to the HTA, 
both the Health Research Authority and the ICO have released guidance on consent. 
Specifically, according to the HRA’s website:50
For the purposes of the GDPR, the legal basis for processing data for health and social care 
research should NOT be consent. This means that requirements in the GDPR relating to 
consent do NOT apply to health and care research
The logical consequence of this guidance is that the basis of lawful processing of 
data by UK-based biobanks is legitimate interest, rather than consent. However, the 
ICO also indicates in its guidance that organisations ‘are likely to need to consider 
consent when no other lawful basis obviously applies’.51 Furthermore, when dealing 
with human tissue, as consent is the central principle upon which the Human Tissue 
Act is based, biobanks that handle tissue samples are likely to be required to obtain 
consent from research participants in order to collect samples and conduct research.
2.3.3  Legitimate Public Interest as a Basis for Lawful Processing
According to the UK’s Data Protection Act, processing of personal data that is ‘nec-
essary for scientific … research purposes’ is lawful.52 This includes personal data in 
one of the GDPR’s ‘special categories’, which include genetic data and data con-
cerning health. The data held by biobanks includes ‘special category’ data under the 
GDPR and Data Protection Act. Biobanks may collect and process several different 
types of ‘special category’ data. Processing of such data by a biobank that is neces-
sary when carrying out research is lawful, so long as it is consistent with the Data 
Protection Act’s section 19 requirements and so long as it is in the public interest.53 
Section 19 provides that the processing may not, however, be ‘likely to cause sub-
stantial damage or substantive distress to a data subject’.54 It is possible that bio-
banking activities could do so, for instance, if they brought to light information 
about someone’s genetic predispositions to medical conditions. However, where the 
data processing is necessary for ‘the purposes of approved medical research’, then 
50 Ibid, citing Health Research Authority (last updated 19 April 2019) Consent in research. (NHS) 
https://www.hra.nhs.uk/planning-and-improving-research/policies-standards-legislation/data-pro-
tection-and-information-governance/gdpr-guidance/what-law-says/consent-research/.
51 Taylor et al. (2018), p. 639 citing ICO When is consent appropriate? https://ico.org.uk/for-organ-
isations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/consent/
when-is-consent-appropriate/; Mahsa and Borry (2018), p.  149; Ford et  al. (2019), p. e10191; 
Townend (2018), pp. 657–664; Budin-Ljøsne et al. (2017), p. 4; Mc Cullagh K (2019) UK: GDPR 
adaptions and preparations for withdrawal from the EU: 108–119. https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.
uk/70040/1/national_adaptations_of_the_gdpr_final_version_27_february_1.pdf.
52 DPA, section 19 (1)(b).
53 DPA, schedule 1, part 1, section 4.
54 DPA, section 19 (2).
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it is compliant with the Data Protection Act.55 ‘Approved medical research’ requires 
ethical clearance, either under the Health Research Authority, or a body appointed 
by the NHS or a research institution, such as a University.56
Under the Health Research Authority guidance, data subjects who are research 
participants in public sector research projects must be informed that processing of 
personal data for research purposes is in the public interest.57
2.3.4  Adequacy Decisions, ‘Appropriate Safeguards’ (Standard 
Contractual Clauses and Binding Corporate Rules), and Special 
Circumstances as a Basis for Transfer of Data to ‘Third Countries’
Under the GDPR, and Data Protection Act, it is unlawful to transfer personal data to 
a ‘third country’ unless there is a lawful basis for such transfer.58 While the UK 
remained a Member State of the EU, and during the ‘transition’ period until end 
December 2020, organisations (including biobanks) processing data in the UK were 
able to rely on the grounds set out in chapter V of the GDPR, and chapter 5 of the 
DPA, as a basis for the lawful transfer of data out of the UK to ‘third countries’ (i.e. 
non-EU countries). 
Biobanks in the UK may lawfully transfer personal data to a third country where 
the transfer is based on an ‘adequacy decision’.59 Such adequacy decisions are taken 
by the European Commission.
In the absence of an adequacy decision, transfer may take place where ‘appropri-
ate safeguards’ are provided. One such appropriate safeguard is the use of standard 
contractual clauses. Article 57 of the GDPR provides for each supervisory authority 
to create standard contractual clauses, which businesses can use in their agreements 
for data processing and transfer. The UK’s ICO has created templates for both con-
troller to processor contracts60 and controller to controller contracts,61 which bio-
banks can use. The ICO has also produced guidance on what organisations need to 
55 DPA, section 19 (3).
56 DPA, section 19 (4).
57 Taylor et al. (2018), p. 639 citing Health Research Authority NHS (last updated 8 May 2018) 
Legal basis for processing data. https://www.hra.nhs.uk/planning-and-improving-research/poli-
cies-standards-legislation/data-protection-and-information-governance/gdpr-detailed-guidance/
legal-basis-processing-data/.
58 DPA, section 73.
59 DPA, section 74.
60 ICO Build a controller to processor contract. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/data-protec-
tion-and-brexit/how-to-transfer-data-from-europe-from-the-eea-to-the-uk-using-standard-con-
tractual-clauses-sccs/build-a-controller-to-processor-contract/.
61 ICO Build a controller to controller contract https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/data-protection-
and-brexit/how-to-transfer-data-from-europe-from-the-eea-to-the-uk-using-standard-contractual-
clauses-sccs/build-a-controller-to-controller-contract/.
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include in contracts for data transfer.62 The Health Research Authority’s guidance 
confirms the lawfulness of such data transfers.63
However, as Lawlor et al. write, standard contractual clauses may not be the best 
suited mechanism for biobanking research.64 Their work is concerned with research 
conducted by biobanks more generally, rather than specifically those based in the 
UK. They suggest that making more use of material transfer agreements, and devel-
opment of a code of conduct, would assist international biobank research 
collaborations.
BBMRI-ERIC have also called for the development of a Code of Conduct for 
Health Research.65 The aim is to ‘reach a sector-specific code that explains how the 
GDPR applies in practice.’66 130 individuals representing 80 organisations in the 
field of health research support the idea of such a Code.67 This initiative is interna-
tional in nature. The most recent Code drafting meeting took place in Rome in 
November 2018.68 If it is eventually approved under Article 40 of the GDPR, the 
Code would apply broadly to a wide range of health research and would be of assis-
tance to biobanks engaging in international data transfer into EU Member States 
and also potentially for those sending data outside the EU.
Another type of appropriate safeguard is ‘binding corporate rules’.69
It is also permissible for a UK-based biobank to transfer data to a third country 
on the basis of special circumstances.70 The most relevant circumstances that could 
be relied upon are those set out in DPA, section 76(1) (a) and (b), which allow for 
transfer in order to ‘protect the vital interests of the data subject or another person’ 
or ‘to safeguard the legitimate interests of the data subject’. Explicit consent of the 
data subject to the transfer is another possible ‘special circumstance’ but this would 
not be practical for biobanks to secure.
62 ICO What needs to be included in the contract? https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-
to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/contracts-and-liabilities-
between-controllers-and-processors-multi/what-needs-to-be-included-in-the-contract/.
63 Taylor et al. (2018), p. 639 citing Health Research Authority NHS (last updated 8 May 2018) 
Legal basis for processing data. https://www.hra.nhs.uk/planning-and-improving-research/poli-
cies-standards-legislation/data-protection-and-information-governance/gdpr-detailed-guidance/
legal-basis-processing-data/.
64 Lawlor RT, Kozlakidis Z, Bledsoe M (14 November 2018) GDPR in biobanking for precision 
medicine research: The challenges. Open Access Government https://www.openaccessgovern-
ment.org/gdpr-in-biobanking-for-precision-medicine/54468/.
65 Code of Conduct for Health Research http://code-of-conduct-for-health-research.eu/faq.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Code of Conduct for Health Research (05/11/2018 – 06/112018) CoC Drafting Group Meeting 
https://code-of-conduct-for-health-research.eu/events/coc-drafting-group-meeting-6.
69 GDPR, Article 47.
70 GDPR, Article 49; DPA, section 75.
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3  The Political and Legal Processes of Brexit to Date
This section of the chapter explains the political processes following the EU refer-
endum in June 2016, and sets out the current legal position in general terms. Its 
specific application to biobanking, especially GDPR aspects, is discussed in 
Sect. 4 below.
Following an (advisory) referendum, and an Act of Parliament,71 the latter as 
required ‘in accordance with [the UK’s] constitutional requirements’,72 the UK for-
mally notified its intention to leave the EU on 29 March 2017, as specified under 
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. Under Article 50 (3) TEU, the default 
position was that the UK would leave the EU on 29 March 2019.
Article 50 TEU obliged the EU-27 to negotiate a Withdrawal Agreement with the 
UK. By 25 November 2018, the UK had agreed a draft Withdrawal Agreement with 
the EU’s negotiating team, which was duly approved by the Council of the EU-27, 
along with a non-binding political declaration on the future EU-UK relationship.73 
However, the UK government was unable to secure support in Parliament for 
 ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement.74 Nonetheless, in a non-binding vote, the 
House of Commons also indicated its opposition to leaving the EU without a 
Withdrawal Agreement in place.75
In March 2019,76 and again in April 2019,77 the EU and UK agreed, in accor-
dance with Article 50 (3) TEU, to extend the withdrawal negotiation period. As at 
May 2019, it was agreed that the UK would leave the EU on 31 October 2019, 
unless the Withdrawal Agreement was ratified before that date, in which case the 
UK would have left when the Withdrawal Agreement entered into force. As things 
stood when we originally wrote this chapter, thus, on the date of entry into force of 
the Withdrawal Agreement, or on 31 October 2019, the UK would have ceased to be 
71 European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017.
72 Article 50 TEU; R on the application of Miller and another v Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union [2017] UKSC 5.
73 See Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, OJ 2019 C 66 I/01; Draft 
Political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European 
Union and the United Kingdom, OJ 2019 C 66 I/185; Council Decision (EU) 2019/274 on the 
signing, on behalf of the European Union and of the European Atomic Energy Community, of the 
Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from 
the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community OJ 2019 LI 47/1.
74 As we write, there have been three attempts to secure approval for the Withdrawal Agreement 
from the UK’s House of Commons on 15 January 2019 (defeated by 230 votes); 12 March 2019 
(defeated by 149 votes) and 29 March (defeated by 58 votes).
75 The House of Commons voted, on 13 March 2019, to reject leaving the EU without a Withdrawal 
Agreement (321 to 278, a margin of 43 votes).
76 European Council Decision (EU) 2019/476 taken in agreement with the United Kingdom of 22 
March 2019 extending the period under Article 50(3)TEU OJ 2019 L 801/1.
77 European Council Decision (EU) 2019/584 taken in agreement with the United Kingdom of 11 
April 2019 extending the period under Article 50(3) TEU OJ 2019 L 101/1.
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a Member State of the EU. What actually happened was that the UK did not leave 
the EU until 31 January 2020, at which point a revised Withdrawal Agreement 
entered into force. 
The Withdrawal Agreement provides for a ‘transition’ or ‘implementation’ 
period, which ends on 31 December 2020.78 In principle, during the transition 
period, EU law applies to and in the UK, producing the same legal effects, and being 
interpreted and applied in accordance with the same methods and principles, as 
before withdrawal.79 This means that EU law as it stands at ‘Exit Day’ and as it 
evolves through the transition period will produce legal effects in the UK during the 
transition period.80
During transition, EU institutions, bodies and agencies, including the Court of 
Justice of the EU, have powers in relation to the UK, and to natural and legal per-
sons established in the UK.81 But this is ‘unless otherwise provided’ in the 
Withdrawal Agreement.82 So, for instance, the UK will no longer be included in EU 
institutions, bodies or agencies, and the UK’s institutions will not be considered 
institutions of a Member State.83 Access to networks, information systems and EU 
databases ceases at the end of transition.84
The transition period may be extended once, ‘to a period up to [31 December 
XXXX]’, by a decision of a ‘Joint Committee’85 made before 1 July 2020.86 The 
current political intention of the UK government is not to seek extension.
The UK has made initial domestic provision for withdrawal from the EU through 
the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018. The EU (Withdrawal) Act originally provided for an 
‘Exit Day’ of 29 March 2019. This was amended by statutory instrument on 11 
April 2019, so that Exit Day is currently defined in UK domestic law as  on 30 
October 2019, so that Exit Day is defined in UK domestic law as 31 January 2020 87
The Act repeals the European Communities Act 1972, which is the domestic 
provision through which EU law applies in the UK and is a source of UK law. The 
EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 creates, on Exit Day, a new source of UK law: ‘retained 
EU law’. In essence, all EU law applicable in the UK on that date will be part of UK 
law by virtue of the Act.
78 WA, Article 126.
79 WA, Article 127.
80 WA, Article 6.
81 WA, Article 131.
82 WA, Article 127.
83 WA, Article 128.
84 WA, Article 8.
85 An institution comprising representatives of the EU and UK, established by the WA, Article 164. 
Its obligations include to supervise and facilitate the implementation of the WA.
86 WA, Article 132.
87 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (Exit Day) (No 3) Regulations 2019 SI 2019/1423 30 
October 2019. This statutory instrument makes no provision for an earlier Exit Day in the event 
that the Withdrawal Agreement is ratified. If it is, a further statutory instrument will be necessary 
to define Exit Day accordingly.
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4  The Legal Position for GDPR Aspects of Biobanking 
Post-Brexit
All of the different types of biobank structures in the UK have been and will con-
tinue to be affected by Brexit, but in different ways. Smaller biobanks that collect, 
process or share data solely within the UK are affected less, although the applicable 
law will change. Larger, networked, UK-based biobanks that share data outward to 
the EU and other countries, and those which receive inward coming data from the 
EU and other countries are affected more, because pre-Brexit and pre-transition the 
basis on which the lawfulness of data protection in those transactions is secured is 
the UK’s membership of the EU and the Withdrawal Agreement. Some biobanks, 
for instance, commercial operators, may be able to circumvent the inconvenience of 
Brexit, and continue to operate as before within the EU, by incorporating in an EU 
Member State. This approach is not open to university-based or governmental/insti-
tutional UK biobanks. Those biobanks that rely on EU networks and funding may 
find that they are totally excluded from such access, depending on the form that the 
future EU-UK trade relationship takes.
We now focus on the legal position for UK data protection law, as it applies in 
biobanking contexts, post-Brexit. In the run up to 29 March 2019, the UK govern-
ment issued several guidance notes and other policy documents giving advice about 
the post-Brexit legal position. Some of this guidance is relevant to the GDPR and 
biobanking. Of course, however, the views of the government, even expressed in 
formal guidance notes, do not have the force of ‘hard’ law. The section therefore 
outlines the position under the only relevant primary UK legislation currently 
enacted at the time of writing: the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, and under relevant 
secondary (delegated) legislation in the form of statutory instruments. These latter 
are executive acts with the full force of law in the UK.88 These provisions apply 
whatever the form of Brexit, and do not distinguish between the position under the 
Withdrawal Agreement and that in a ‘No Deal’ situation  (which did not, in the 
end, occur).
We then consider the legal position under each of the possible forms of Brexit 
discussed in this chapter: under the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, and what the 
position would have been in the event of a No Deal Brexit. We have retained the 
latter analysis to illustrate both the complexities of Brexit and the position should 
the EU and UK be unable to agree a trade agreement by the end of December 2020. 
When we originally wrote this chapter, we did not know how the UK would imple-
ment its obligations under the Withdrawal Agreement, so that analysis is by defini-
tion more conjectural. 
88 For further information, see UK Parliament Statutory Instruments (Sis) https://www.parliament.
uk/site-information/glossary/statutory-instruments-sis/.
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4.1  Domestic Legislation, Statutory Instruments, ‘Soft Law’, 
Guidance
4.1.1  Soft Law and Guidance on Data Protection Post-Brexit
In December 2018, the UK government issued a technical note giving guidance on 
data protection post-Brexit. That guidance was withdrawn on 1 March 2019,89 and 
replaced with revised guidance adopted on 6 February 2019.90 It complements guid-
ance from the ICO91 on the future data protection regime in case of a No Deal 
Brexit, which remains in place. The guidance applies to all organisations to which 
the GDPR applies, so it applies to UK biobanks.
4.1.2  Data Protection Under the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018
 As ‘retained EU law’, the GDPR is in principle part of UK law on Exit Day, under 
the terms of the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018.
However, the GDPR (as a source of ‘retained EU law’) will be subject to future 
amendments made by the UK legislator. Any such amendments are legally autho-
rised on the basis of powers set out in the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, the Data 
Protection Act 2018, and the European Communities Act 1972. These powers allow 
the UK government to act unilaterally to remedy any ‘deficiencies’ in ‘retained EU 
law’. These amendments will take effect through secondary legislation: the Data 
Protection, Privacy and Electronic Communications (Amendments etc) (EU Exit) 
Regulations 2019,92 and any subsequent secondary legislation. The EU (Withdrawal) 
Act 2018 makes no provision for UK compliance with the Withdrawal Agreement 
(see further below in Sect. 4.2.3).
89 Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sports (13 September 2018, this guidance was with-
drawn on the 1st of March 2019) Data protection if there’s no Brexit deal. https://www.gov.uk/
g o v e r n m e n t / p u b l i c a t i o n s / d a t a - p r o t e c t i o n - i f - t h e r e s - n o - b r e x i t - d e a l /
data-protection-if-theres-no-brexit-deal.
90 Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sports (6 February 2019) Using personal data after 
Brexit. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/using-personal-data-after-brexit. We make no further com-
ment on the obvious unsatisfactory nature of guidance from 6 February 2019 not replacing guid-
ance from December 2018 until 1 March 2019.
91 ICO, Data protection and Brexit https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/data-protection-and-brexit/.
92 SI No 419 28 February 2019 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/419/pdfs/
uksi_20190419_en.pdf.
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4.1.3  The Data Protection, Privacy and Electronic Communications 
(Amendments Etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019
The Data Protection, Privacy and Electronic Communications (Amendments etc) 
(EU Exit) Regulations 201993 (hereafter, ‘the EU Exit Regulations’) amend various 
parts of legislation to take account of the UK leaving the EU. They came into force 
on Exit Day. In summary, the Regulations amend the Data Protection Act 2018, the 
GDPR as ‘retained EU law’ (known in the Regulations as ‘the UK GDPR’), and 
merge provisions of the two.94 Schedule 1 lists the amendments to the UK GDPR, 
while schedule 2 deals with the amendments to the Data Protection Act 2018. 
Schedule 3 deals with consequential amendments to other legislation, and schedule 
4 addresses amendments consequential on provisions of the 2018 Act.
The UK government claims95 that the majority of the changes to the existing law 
involve removing references to EU institutions and procedures that will not be 
directly relevant when the UK is outside the EU. This is accurate. Many changes, 
for instance, simply change ‘the Union’ or ‘a Member State’ for ‘the UK’; or ‘the 
competent authority’ for ‘the Commissioner’, that is, the Information Commissioner 
as referred to in the Data Protection Act, section 114 and schedule 12.
However, the EU Exit Regulations do make some changes to the legal position 
beyond removing references to the EU and its institutions and procedures. The key 
changes of relevance or potential relevance to biobanking are as follows:
 (a) Adequacy decisions
 (b) Standard data protection contractual clauses
 (c) Information exchange and cooperation
 (d) Removal of procedural and remedial safeguards
 (e) General principles of EU law.
(a) Adequacy Decisions
The EU Exit Regulations add new sections 17A and 17B, and 74A to the Data 
Protection Act 2018. These give the Secretary of State power to adopt adequacy 
decisions by regulations, and oblige the Secretary of State to keep such decisions 
under periodic review. An adequacy decision may be taken in respect of a third 
93 Ibid.
94 The Explanatory Note to the SI reads ‘Among other things, changes made by Schedules 1 and 2 
have the effect of merging two pre-existing regimes for the regulation of the processing of personal 
data – namely that established by the GDPR as supplemented by Chapter 2 of Part 2 of the DPA 
2018 as originally enacted, and that established in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the DPA 2018 as origi-
nally enacted (the applied GDPR). The applied GDPR extended GDPR standards to certain pro-
cessing out of scope of EU law and the GDPR.  Regulation 5 makes provision concerning 
interpretation in relation to processing that prior to exit day was subject to the applied GDPR.’
95 Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sports, Data protection if there’s no Brexit deal (n 89).
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country (which in this context, contrary to its meaning in EU and international law, 
means a country outside of the UK96); a territory or one or more sectors within a 
third country; an international organisation (such as the EU); or a description of 
such a country, territory, sector or organisation. Transfer of personal data from the 
UK to such a country, territory, sector or organisation would not be lawful in the 
absence of an adequacy decision, or other basis for lawful transfer, such as ‘special 
circumstances’, or ‘standard data protection clauses’ (see below in Sect. 4.3.2).
When assessing the adequacy of protection in a third state or international organ-
isation, the Secretary of State must take into account a list of factors outlined in new 
section 74A of the Data Protection Act. These repeat verbatim the matters that the 
European Commission should take into account when assessing adequacy, as pro-
vided in Article 45 (2) GDPR. Briefly, these include:
(a) the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, relevant legislation, 
both general and sectoral, including concerning public security, defence, national security 
and criminal law and the access of public authorities to personal data, as well as the imple-
mentation of such legislation, data protection rules, professional rules and security mea-
sures, including rules for the onward transfer of personal data to another third country or 
international organisation which are complied with in that country or international organ-
isation, case-law, as well as effective and enforceable data subject rights and effective 
administrative and judicial redress for the data subjects whose personal data are being 
transferred;
(b) the existence and effective functioning of one or more independent supervisory authori-
ties in the third country … including adequate enforcement powers, for assisting and 
 advising the data subjects in exercising their rights and for cooperation with the supervisory 
authorities of the Member States;
and (c) the international commitments the third country … has entered into, or other obliga-
tions arising from legally binding conventions or instruments as well as from its participa-
tion in multilateral or regional systems…
The Secretary of State must monitor developments in such third countries, sec-
tors etc, and amend or revoke adequacy decisions accordingly, having given the 
country etc the opportunity to remedy any lack of protection. In addition, each ade-
quacy decision must be reviewed at least once every 4 years.97
The UK government’s guidance explains that the UK ‘will transitionally recog-
nise all EEA countries (including EU Member States) and Gibraltar as ‘adequate’ to 
allow data flows from the UK to Europe to continue,’ and ‘preserve the effect of 
existing EU adequacy decisions’, including the EU-US Privacy Shield, on a transi-
tional basis.98 The Data Protection, Privacy and Electronic Communications 
(Amendments etc) (EU Exit) (No. 2), Regulations 2019, schedule 2, article 102, 
96 New provision in Article 4 GDPR, after para 26.
97 Data Protection Act 2018, new Sections 17B and 74B.
98 Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport (updated 11 April 2019) Amendments to UK 
data protection law in the event the UK leaves the EU without a deal. (UK Government, Guidance 
Note) https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/data-protection-law-eu-exit/amendments- 
to-uk-data-protection-law-in-the-event-the-uk-leaves-the-eu-without-a-deal-on-29-march-2019.
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inserting a new Schedule 21 into the UK GDPR provides that all EEA states (which 
of course include all EU27 Member States), Gibraltar, EU and EEA institutions, and 
all the third countries, territories, sectors or international organisations which the 
EU recognises with adequacy clauses (Switzerland, Canada, Argentina, Guernsey, 
Isle of Man, Jersey, Faroe Isles, Andorra, Israel, Uruguay, New Zealand, and the 
USA) are regarded as countries etc which the UK recognises as having an adequate 
level of protection for personal data transferred from the UK into that country. In the 
context of biobanking this means that it will be lawful for biobanks in the UK to 
continue to conduct data transfers of UK citizens’ data, and other data they hold, to 
organisations based in all of these places.
Obviously the UK’s EU Exit Regulations can make no provision for the transfer 
of personal data into the UK from another country. Non-EU countries will each 
need to decide how to treat the UK as a non-EU Member State, when, up to the end 
of the transition period they have been recognising the UK’s treatment of personal 
data as adequate because the UK is an EU Member State. It was reported in April 
2019 that some countries have indicated that they will continue to allow free data 
flow into the UK, even in the event of a No Deal Brexit.99 This might be the case also 
in the event of a failure to agree an EU-UK trade agreement. These countries include 
Switzerland, Israel, and the USA. The legal nature of these permissions is domestic 
law within each third country.
Transfer of personal data from EU Member States into the UK post Brexit 
remains subject to EU law. In the absence of any other provision being in place 
(but see further below Sects. 4.2.1 and 4.3.1), the UK is treated as a ‘third country’ 
in the terms of the GDPR. This will mean that transfer of data to biobanks in the 
UK is  unlawful, unless there is a lawful basis for that transfer as provided for 
under the GDPR. At present, there is no agreement on how the UK and EU are to 
treat each other’s assessments of adequacy. The biobanking sector, like many (or 
possibly all) other sectors which rely on sharing of data across borders, have noted 
that it would be beneficial if some agreement was reached that would allow for 
mutual recognition. This will be easier to achieve because Brexit took place under 
the Withdrawal Agreement, as opposed to on a ‘No Deal’ basis (see further 
below section 4.2).
(b) Standard Data Protection Contractual Clauses and Binding Corporate Rules
Approach to  Standard Data Protection Contractual Clauses and  Binding 
Corporate Rules
The EU Exit Regulations 2019 purport to offer some level of legal continuity, as 
they amend the Data Protection Act to provide that standard contractual clauses and 
binding corporate rules that are authorised before Exit Day will remain valid.100 
99 Linkomies (April 2019), pp. 8–9.
100 Data Protection Act 2018, new Schedule 21, sections 7, 8 and 9, added by Data Protection, 
Privacy and Electronic Communications (Amendments etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 http://
A. M. Phillips and T. K. Hervey
163
UK-based biobanks which currently transfer UK citizens’ data, and other data they 
hold, to organisations based in other countries, on the basis of standard data protec-
tion contractual clauses or binding corporate rules, will be able to continue to do so 
after Exit Day. Post-Brexit, standard contractual clauses become known as ‘stan-
dard data protection clauses’ in UK law.101 The EU Exit Regulations also empower 
the Information Commissioner to withdraw authorisation for binding corpo-
rate rules.102
Schedule 2 of the EU Exit Regulations adds new sections 17C and 119A to the 
Data Protection Act. These provisions address standard data protection clauses. 
Such clauses are those which the Secretary of State considers provide appropriate 
safeguards for transfers of data to a third country or international organisation, in 
accordance with new sections 17A and 17B. Schedule 3 of the Regulations revokes 
existing EU law (that otherwise would become retained EU law) which provides for 
standard contractual clauses.103 To replace this, the Information Commissioner is 
empowered, in consultation with the Secretary of State, and any other stakeholders 
the Commissioner considers appropriate,104 to specify ‘standard data protection 
clauses’ which are sufficient to provide adequate safeguards for the purposes of 
transfer of data to a third country or international organisation,105 and also to amend 
or withdraw such standard clauses.106 In effect, standard contractual clauses become 
standard data protection clauses in the Regulations. Documents issued by the 
Commissioner specifying standard data protection clauses are subject to a negative 
Parliamentary assent procedure.107 For UK-based biobanks wishing to continue to 
conduct data transfers of UK citizens’ data, and other data they hold, to 
www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/419/pdfs/uksi_20190419_en.pdf.
101 Data Protection, Privacy and Electronic Communications (Amendments etc) (EU Exit) 
Regulations 2019 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/419/pdfs/uksi_20190419_en.pdf, 
Schedule 1 of Regulation 3, section 39.
102 Data Protection Act 2018, new Schedule 21, section 9 (5).
103 Commission Decision 2001/497/EC of 15th June 2001 on standard contractual clauses for the 
transfer of personal data to third countries, under Directive 95/46/EC OJ 2001 L 181/19;… (g) 
Commission Decision 2004/915/EC of 27th December 2004 amending Decision 2001/497/EC as 
regards the introduction of an alternative set of standard contractual clauses for the transfer of 
personal data to third countries OJ 2004 L 385/74; (i) Commission Decision 2010/87/EU of 5th 
February 2010 on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to processors estab-
lished in third countries under Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
OJ 2016  L 344/100;… and (q) Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/2297 of 16th 
December 2016 amending Decisions 2001/497/EC and 2010/87/EU on standard contractual 
clauses for the transfer of personal data to third countries and to processors established in such 
countries, under Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council OJ 2016 L 
344/100.
104 Data Protection Act 2018, new section 119A (4).
105 Data Protection Act 2018, new section 119A (1).
106 Data Protection Act 2018, new section 119A (2).
107 Data Protection Act 2018, new section 119A (6). Under the negative Parliamentary assent pro-
cedure, a statutory instrument laid before Parliament becomes law on the day the Minister signs it, 
and automatically remains law unless a motion to reject it is agreed by either the House of 
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organisations based in other countries, standard data protection contractual clauses 
are a potential basis for lawful transfer of data post-transition.
Again, as with adequacy decisions, the UK’s EU Exit Regulations can make no 
provision for the post-transition transfer of data from EU-based entities, or those 
based in other countries, to UK-based biobanks. There is (as yet) no agreement on 
coordination or mutual recognition of such clauses between the UK and the EU, and 
in any event the nature of these clauses is currently the subject of litigation before 
the CJEU (see further below, Sect. 4.3.1).108 Despite this, the ICO has produced an 
interactive tool for businesses to deal with standard contractual clauses if the UK 
does leave the EU without a deal.109 The ICO recommends that organisations that 
need ‘to maintain the free flow of personal data into the UK from Europe, in the 
event the UK exits the EU without a deal… should consider using standard contract 
clauses’.110 But the ICO can only account for movement of data out of the UK, not 
into the UK. To write of ‘free flow’ of data, as the ICO’s recommendations do, is to 
misrepresent the formal legal position. It is not yet clear what the EU’s position will 
be on data transfer into the UK from the EU following a the failure to agree a trade 
agreement at the end of transition (see further below in Sect. 4.3.1).
(c) Information Exchange and Cooperation
The EU Exit Regulations remove all obligations on the UK, or entities within the 
UK, to cooperate within the structures of the EU, or to exchange information with 
the European Commission. Instead, the Regulations envisage that the Council of 
Europe’s Data Protection Convention111 (which the UK has signed and ratified) will 
be the basis of interstate data protection cooperation post  transition, through the 
Convention’s obligations to designate one or more authorities to furnish information 
to authorities in other states on law and administrative practice in data protection.112 
This Convention is the first binding international instrument on individual personal 
Commons or the House of Lords within 40 sitting days. See https://www.parliament.uk/site-infor-
mation/glossary/negative-procedure/.
108 Case C-311/18 Schrems II, reference for a preliminary ruling from the Irish High Court 9 
May 2018.
109 ICO (2019a) Do I need to use standard contractual clauses (SCCs) for transfers from the EEA 
to the UK (if we leave the EU with no deal)? https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/data-protection-
and-brexit/standard-contractual-clauses-for-transfers-from-the-eea-to-the-uk-interactive-tool/.
110 ICO (2019b) How to transfer data from Europe (from the EEA) to the UK using standard con-
tractual clauses (SCCs) https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/data-protection-and-brexit/
how-to-transfer-data-from-europe-from-the-eea-to-the-uk-using-standard-contractual-
clauses-sccs/.
111 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data (the Data Protection Convention) ETS No.108, Strasbourg, 1981.
112 Under the Data Protection Convention, Article 13. See The Data Protection, Privacy and 
Electronic Communications (Amendments etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 SI No 419 28 February 
2019 Reg 3 Sch 1 6(10) http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/419/pdfs/
uksi_20190419_en.pdf.
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data protection. It seeks to prohibit abuses that may arise when personal data is 
 collected or processed, to ensure that sensitive data (such as concerning health) is 
subject to legal safeguards, to secure a ‘right to know’ what information is held, and 
to regulate the flow of personal data across borders. The UK’s data protection law 
secures compliance with these international obligations. The Data Protection 
Convention will thus have increased significance to the UK’s data protection frame-
work post-Brexit, where there continues to be uncertainty about how the EU will 
treat the UK for data protection purposes post-transition. This will depend on the 
type of Brexit (see further below), and what the EU and the UK eventually agree in 
terms of future EU-UK relationships.
(d) Procedural and Remedial Safeguards 
The EU Exit Regulations remove the obligation to the effect that the authority that 
supervises the application of the GDPR (in the UK, the Information Commissioner) 
must, when imposing administrative fines, comply with national and EU law on 
procedural safeguards, including effective judicial remedy and process.113 Instead, 
section 115 (9) of the Data Protection Act makes provision about the exercise of the 
Commissioner’s functions when imposing administrative fines. The right to an 
effective remedy and other general principles of EU law concerning due process are 
an important feature of EU law in various contexts, including data protection. 
Essentially driven by the CJEU, these principles have formed an important part of 
the development of EU data protection law, which includes the entitlement of data 
subjects to secure effective remedies for breach, part of the overall compliance and 
sanctions regime under the GDPR.
The Data Protection Act, section 115 (9), as amended, provides that the 
Commissioner may only exercise its powers to issue administrative fines by giving 
a penalty notice, as provided for in section 155, having determined that a person 
has failed, in the sense prescribed in section 149, to comply with provisions of the 
GDPR. The pre-Brexit position was that this form of implementation is—at least 
in theory—subject to scrutiny for compliance with general principles of EU law. 
Post- transition, this layer of scrutiny is removed. However, of course, the UK will 
retain its obligations to due process under the ECHR, such as a right to a fair 
hearing.
(e) General Principles of EU Law
The EU Exit Regulations exclude from application any case law or general princi-
ples of EU law not relevant to the GDPR, or chapter 2 or Parts 5–7 of the Data 
Protection Act.114 These are the parts of the existing law concerning interpretation of 
113 Regulation 3, Schedule 3, chapter 8, Regulation 62 (7), removing Article 83 (8) of the GDPR.
114 Regulation 5 (3).
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the applicable legal provisions. The change made by the EU Exit Regulations 
means, for instance, that future CJEU interpretations of broader principles of EU 
law, such as under the EU CFR, and in Mangold-type cases,115 will not apply in the 
UK as retained EU law. This is consistent with the amendment to the Data Protection 
Act, section 205, which provides that references in that Act to a ‘fundamental right 
or fundamental freedom’ are only to such fundamental rights and freedoms which 
continue to form part of UK domestic law after Exit Day. The European Union 
(Withdrawal) Act, section 4, provides that EU law rights, obligations, or remedies 
that come from the CJEU’s jurisprudence continue to be part of ‘retained EU law’, 
only if they are recognised as such in a case decided by the CJEU before Exit Day. 
The intention seems to be to sever the way that relevant law in the UK is interpreted 
from how those interpretations develop in the EU, following Exit Day, and to do so 
irrespective of whether the Withdrawal Agreement—which provides in its Article 
131 that the CJEU’s jurisdiction continues in the UK during transition—is agreed or 
not. The implications of this are difficult to ascertain. During transition, the European 
Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 ‘switches back on’ the European 
Communities Act 1972, to the effect that EU law (including judgments of the CJEU) 
continues to apply to and within the UK until the end of December 2020. However, 
after that, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act, section 4, provides that EU law 
rights, obligations, or remedies that come from the CJEU’s jurisprudence continue 
to be part of ‘retained EU law’, only if they are recognised as such in a case decided 
by the CJEU before Exit Day (not the end of transition). The intention seems to be 
to sever the way that relevant law in the UK is interpreted from how those interpre-
tations develop in the EU, following Exit Day, and to do so despite the fact that the 
Withdrawal Agreement provides in its Article 131 that the CJEU’s jurisdiction con-
tinues in the UK during transition. Questions about the significance of this legisla-
tion go to questions of future regulatory alignment between the UK and the EU, 
which itself will then affect the extent to which the EU is able to recognise the UK’s 
regulatory environment as embodying an adequate protection for data, including the 
kinds of health-related data that biobanks process. These matters are discussed fur-
ther in Sect. 4.2 below.
4.2  The EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement and Biobanking
4.2.1  Data Protection Law Under the Withdrawal Agreement
We note at the start of this section that aspects of the Withdrawal Agreement’s text 
on data protection are difficult to interpret.116 Of course, as the Withdrawal 
Agreement has only recently entered into force, there are no binding judicial rulings 
115 Case C-144/04 Mangold ECLI:EU:C:2005:709.
116 See, for instance, https://privacylawblog.fieldfisher.com/2018/what-does-the-draft-withdrawal-
agreement-mean-for-data-protection: ‘During the transition period the UK loses its seat at the table 
A. M. Phillips and T. K. Hervey
167
on the meaning of its text. The underlying aim of the Withdrawal Agreement is to 
ensure an orderly withdrawal of the UK from the EU, and to avoid disruption during 
the transition period by ensuring that EU law applies to and in the UK during that 
period.117 The Withdrawal Agreement’s provisions should thus be interpreted with 
that aimed-for continuity in mind.
In general, the Withdrawal Agreement provides that the UK is to be treated as a 
Member State of the EU during the transition period.118 So, in general, EU law con-
tinues to apply to and in the UK, as if the UK were still a Member State, from Exit 
Day until the end of transition.119 Thus, the GDPR continues to apply in and to the 
UK during that period. Biobanks in the UK will continue to be required to comply 
with the GDPR. The Withdrawal Agreement also provides that references to com-
petent authorities of Member States in provisions of EU law made applicable by the 
Withdrawal Agreement are to include UK competent authorities.120 This means that, 
until the end December 2020, the UK’s ICO continues to be recognised as an insti-
tution of a Member State, even though the UK is no longer a Member State of the EU.
However, this continuity rule applies only ‘unless otherwise provided’ in the 
Withdrawal Agreement.121 One of the key exclusions concerns the UK’s participa-
tion in EU institutions, and in decision-making and governance of the bodies, offices 
and agencies of the Union. The UK will no longer participates in such entities.122 
The European Data Protection Board, established under the GDPR,123 is (presum-
ably124) a ‘body’ of the Union for these purposes. The Withdrawal Agreement makes 
no explicit provision for the UK’s continued participation in the European Data 
Protection Board or its information sharing systems. The precise modalities of the 
situation where the UK Information Commissioner is excluded from the European 
Data Protection Board, but the ICO is still recognised as a competent national 
in the European Data Protection Board (“EDPB”). But that doesn’t necessarily mean that all the 
provisions which have a link to the EDPB fall away. So, for example, it’s not clear how the one stop 
shop will work during the transition period. Just because the UK Information Commissioner loses 
her seat at the table doesn’t necessarily mean that the entire one stop shop mechanism simply 
won’t apply to the UK. If that were the case it would undermine the central policy of the transition 
period, which is to maintain consistency as between the regimes in the UK and the EU. The detail 
of how all this will work in practice is still very unclear.’
117 WA, recitals 5 and 8.
118 WA, Article 127 (6).
119 WA, Article 127 (1).
120 WA, Article 7.
121 WA, Article 127.
122 WA, Article 7 (1) (b). This is not the hoped-for outcome that the UK’s Information Commissioner 
would continue to be part of the EDPB post-Brexit (the so-called ‘adequacy plus’ scenario), see 
https://www.dpnetwork.org.uk/opinion/brexit-data-protection-update/.
123 GDPR, Article 68.
124 GDPR, Article 68 provides ‘the European Data Protection Board ... is hereby established as a 
body of the Union ...’. It is assumed that the interpretation of ‘body’ in this context under the 
Withdrawal Agreement would be consistent with the use of the term in EU legislation such as 
the GDPR.
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authority under the GDPR, are far from clear. This may have practical implications 
for UK-based biobanks, for instance seeking to rely on the European Data Protection 
Board’s guidance on the ‘one stop shop’ principle, in terms of which national super-
visory authority should be the lead supervisory authority after Exit day and during 
transition. Biobanks which operate across the EU and the UK may find themselves 
subject to parallel proceedings.125
The Withdrawal Agreement has a separate title (Title VII) on data processing. It 
covers ‘Union law on the protection of personal data’, which includes the GDPR,126 
but excludes the GDPR’s Chapter VII, which covers cooperation between supervi-
sory authorities in the EU, consistency, dispute resolution and the European Data 
Protection Board. Title VII of the Withdrawal Agreement also includes ‘any other 
provisions of Union law governing the protection of personal data’.127 Other rele-
vant provisions of Union law include the EU CFR, and ‘general principles’ of EU 
law, both of which include the right to protection of personal data128 and the right to 
privacy.129 There is an unresolved question here about whether the EU Exit 
Regulations’ exclusion of general principles of EU law ‘not relevant to’ the GDPR 
as it applied immediately before Exit Day130 is compliant with the UK’s obligations 
under the Withdrawal Agreement.
Title VII consists of just four provisions, two of which are not relevant to bio-
banking.131 The remaining two provisions have the following implications.
The Withdrawal Agreement, Article 71 provides
(1)  Union law on the protection of personal data shall apply in the United Kingdom in 
respect of the processing of the personal data of data subjects outside the United 
Kingdom, provided that the personal data:
 (a)  were processed under Union law in the United Kingdom before the end of the transi-
tion period; or
 (b)  are processed in the United Kingdom after the end of the transition period on the 
basis of this Agreement.
It is very difficult to make sense of this provision. If the UK is to be treated as if 
it were a Member State of the EU during the transition period,132 and if EU law 
125 See, e.g., https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2018/global/data-protection-and-the- 
draft-brexit-agreement-first-impressions.
126 It also includes a Directive on data processing in the context of criminal offences, Directive 
2016/680/EU OJ 2016 L 119/89; and a Directive on e-communications privacy, Directive 2002/58/
EC OJ 2002 L 201/37.
127 WA, Article 70.
128 EUCFR, Article 8.
129 EUCFR, Article 7; ECHR, Article 8; See, e.g., Case C-139/01 Österreichischer Rundfunk and 
Others: ECLI:EU:C:2003:294; Case C-101/01 Bodil Lindqvist v Åklagarkammaren i Jönköpin 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:596.
130 Regulation 5 (3).
131 WA, Article 72 applies to entities in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors; WA, 
Article 74 applies to classified information concerning national/EU security.
132 WA, Article 127 (6).
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continues to apply to and in the UK during that time,133 the GDPR continues to 
apply as pre-Brexit. Processing in the UK during transition (or afterwards, on the 
basis of the Agreement, for instance, in the case of coordination of social security 
entitlements of migrants) of personal data of data subjects in a Member State (‘data 
subjects outside the United Kingdom’) is protected under the GDPR and its coordi-
nation arrangements, as pre-Brexit. One way to make sense of this provision, there-
fore, is that it is an exception to the general rules in the Withdrawal Agreement. For 
the purposes of transfer of data of a data subject in an EU Member State from that 
EU Member State to the UK for processing, during transition, the UK is not to be 
treated as if it were a Member State, and the GDPR does not apply. But if this is the 
intention of the provision, its drafting is far from clear.
Article 71 covers only personal data of data subjects outside the UK processed or 
obtained before the end of the transition period, or on the basis of the Withdrawal 
Agreement. In effect, it operates as if it were an adequacy decision. It does not cover 
personal data of data subjects within the UK. The majority of data held by UK-based 
biobanks is personal data of UK-based data subjects. But, especially given the way 
in which biobanks are networked, some of their data is personal data of data sub-
jects outside the UK. If this interpretation is correct, the law applicable to UK-based 
biobanks would differ, depending on the source of the personal data. This would 
potentially create difficult—or even impossible—situations for UK-based biobanks 
in terms of data processing, depending on the extent to which UK data protection 
law diverges from EU data protection law. We noted some possible places of diver-
gence in Sect. 4.1.3 above.
Article 71 (2) provides that paragraph 1 does not apply in the event that the 
European Commission adopts an adequacy decision under GDPR, Article 45. There 
is even provision in the Withdrawal Agreement for the withdrawal of an adequacy 
decision during the transitional period. In that event, Article 71 (3) of the Withdrawal 
Agreement provides that ‘to the extent that a decision referred to in paragraph 2 has 
ceased to be applicable’, the UK is obliged to ensure a level of protection of per-
sonal data that is ‘essentially equivalent’ to that in EU law.
Under the Withdrawal Agreement, Article 73, the EU is obliged to continue to 
treat data obtained from the UK before the end of transition, or after the end of 
transition on the basis of the Withdrawal Agreement, the same as data obtained from 
an EU Member State, or rather, not to treat it differently ‘on the sole ground of the 
UK having withdrawn from the Union’.134 This drafting is unfortunate, given that 
the text of the GDPR contemplates only two categories of states: EU Member States 
and ‘third countries’. It is possible that the Withdrawal Agreement’s effect, com-
bined with the GDPR rules on ‘third countries’ is that some kind of provision for 
data transfer into the EU from the UK is necessary during the transition period—be 
that an adequacy decision, appropriate safeguard, or special circumstances. But the 
political declaration on the future relationship between the EU and the UK indicates 
133 WA, Article 127 (1).
134 WA, Article 73.
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that the EU intends to begin the process of adopting an adequacy decision as soon 
as possible after Exit Day, so as to have such a decision in place by the end of transi-
tion. Given that, the better interpretation of the Withdrawal Agreement is intention 
to continue the current legal position between Exit Day and December 2020 (or the 
end of transition if a different date).135
4.2.2  Other Law Relevant to Biobanking Under 
the Withdrawal Agreement
Other aspects of the Withdrawal Agreement will also be significant for biobanking. 
We noted above that the UK participates in the EU-funded BBMRI-ERIC network 
of biobanks and biomolecular resources.136 Under the Withdrawal Agreement, dur-
ing transition, the UK is to be treated as if it were a Member State. The Withdrawal 
Agreement’s financial settlement provisions oblige the UK to continue making con-
tributions to the EU budget as if it were a Member State during 2019 and 2020, and 
pay a share of the EU’s budgetary commitments made under the 2014–2020 
Multiannual Financial Framework (but which are not yet paid on 31 December 
2020 when that framework comes to an end), on which Horizon 2020 funding is 
premised.
This means that access to EU funding for UK-based biobanks (and other research 
organisations) will continue during transition. After the end of transition, the UK 
could become a member, or an observer, of BBMRI-ERIC, if the Assembly of 
Members of BBMRI-ERIC grants its approval. The Assembly must do so on the 
basis of agreement of at least 75% of the Members, representing at least 75% of the 
Members’ annual contributions. This means that no single Member of BBMRI- 
ERIC has a veto. At present, only EEA states are members (Norway included), but 
there is no legal impediment to a third country becoming a member.137
135 See, e.g., https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/brexit-withdrawal- 
agreement-impact-for-data-protection.
136 See Council Regulation (EC) No 723/2009 of 25 June 2009 on the Community legal framework 
for a European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC) amended by Council Regulation (EU) 
No 1261/2013 of 2 December 2013 OJ 2009 L 206/1; The Statutes of BBMRI-ERIC were decided 
for implementation by the European Commission on 22 November 2013, published in the Official 
Journal of the EU on the 30 November and came into force on 3 December 2013 (2013/701/EU). 
OJ 2013 L 326/56.
137 See Regulation (EC) No 723/2009, Article 9 (1) which provides that Member States, associated 
countries, third countries other than associated countries, and intergovernmental organisations that 
have agreed to the Statutes are Members of BBMRI-ERIC.
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4.2.3  Domestic Implementation of the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement138
The Withdrawal Agreement requires the UK to render its obligations under the EU/
UK Withdrawal Agreement into domestic law through domestic primary legisla-
tion.139 As the UK is a ‘dualist’ state, provisions of an international agreement are 
conceptualised as an executive act, and do not have automatic legal effect in its legal 
systems.
The European Union (Withdrawal Agreement ) Act 2020 provides for the contin-
ued application of the European Communities Act 1972 during transition. This 
means the continued supremacy and direct effect of law agreed between the UK and 
the EU (that is, the Withdrawal Agreement). In effect it creates a new source of law 
in the UK’s constitution: that of Withdrawal Agreement law, in the same way that 
the European Communities Act 1972 is, in the words of the UK Supreme Court in 
Miller, the ‘conduit pipe’ by which EU law becomes ‘an independent and overrid-
ing source’ of UK law.140
The benefits of this approach are that it secures compliance with the provisions 
of the Withdrawal Agreement, Article 4, which provides that:
(1) The provisions of this Agreement and the provisions of Union law made applicable by 
this Agreement shall produce in respect of and in the United Kingdom the same legal 
effects as they produce within the Union and its Member States. Accordingly, legal or 
natural persons shall in particular be able to rely directly on the provisions contained 
or referred to in this Agreement which meet the conditions for direct effect under 
Union law.
(2) The United Kingdom shall ensure compliance with paragraph 1, including as regards 
the required powers of its judicial and administrative authorities to disapply inconsistent 
or incompatible domestic provisions, through domestic primary legislation.
(3) The provisions of this Agreement referring to Union law, or to concepts or provisions 
thereof, shall be interpreted and applied in accordance with the methods and general 
principles of Union law.
(4) The provisions of this Agreement referring to Union law, or to concepts or provisions 
thereof shall in their interpretation and application be interpreted in accordance with the 
relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union handed down before the 
end of the transition period.
(5) In the interpretation and application of this Agreement, the United Kingdom’s judicial 
and administrative authorities shall have due regard to relevant case law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union handed down after the end of the transition period.
Further, there is significant jurisprudence, including from the House of Lords 
(the predecessor to the UK Supreme Court, the highest court in the land), on the 
meaning and effect of the relevant parts of the European Communities Act 1972. In 
138 This section is based on T Hervey and S Peers, ‘What might have happened in an alternative 
universe: the  EU Withdrawal Agreement Implementation Bill (‘WAB’) http://eulawanalysis.
blogspot.com/search?q=Hervey.
139 WA, Article 4 (2).
140 Miller case, (n 72), para 65.
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particular, the Factortame ruling141 confirms that domestic legislation, irrespective 
of its date, that cannot be consistently interpreted with directly effective, validly 
adopted EU law, must be disapplied. This approach thus entails significant legal 
certainty and clarity. It is a better approach than either considering the Withdrawal 
Agreement as ‘ordinary’ international law (which would potentially fail to fulfil the 
UK’s Withdrawal Agreement obligations despite the presumption that Parliament 
intends to comply with the UK’s obligations in international law142) or using the 
words of the Withdrawal Agreement itself (which would introduce uncertainty 
about the direct effect of the Withdrawal Agreement, as there is no universal rule in 
EU law as to direct effect of provisions of treaties to which the EU is a party: it is 
dependent on the context, aims and objectives of the treaty concerned143).
In the biobanking context, the consequences are that the decision of the UK to 
‘switch back on’ the existing obligations under the European Communities Act 
1972 makes it easier for the EU to take the view that the UK’s data protection regu-
latory environment is sufficiently protective of personal data to permit data flow into 
the UK. This goes to questions of adequacy decisions, standard contract clauses, 
codes of conduct and binding corporate rules, which are the basis on which data 
from EU Member States (and other countries) may be shared with UK-based bio-
banks after Exit Day.
4.3  The Law If ‘No Deal’ Brexit
4.3.1  The EU’s Position
When we originally wrote this chapter, it was not clear whether the EU and UK 
would agree a Withdrawal Agreement. At that time, the EU had been consistently 
clear in its position that, in the event of a No Deal Brexit, the UK would have been 
treated as an ordinary ‘third country’. The implications for matters such as access to 
EU funding, for instance through the UK’s participation in BBMRI-ERIC, were that 
the existing legal arrangements would have been immediately ceased, unless another 
legal provision was adopted to respond to the exigencies of ‘No Deal’ (so-called 
‘managed No Deal’). In January 2019, the European Commission proposed, on an 
141 Factortame Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport (n 30).
142 See, for instance, Ghaidan v Goden-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30.
143 See, for instance, Case 12/86, Demirel, ECLI:EU:C:1987:400; Case C-262/96, Sürül, 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:228; Case C-63/99, Gloszczuk, ECLI:EU:C:2001:488; C-257/99, Barkoci and 
Malik, ECLI:EU:C:2001:491; Case C 16/05 R (on the application of Veli Tum and Mehmet Dari) 
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ECLI:EU:C:2007:530; Case C-240/09, 
Lesoochranárske Zoskupenie (Slovak Brown Bear), ECLI:EU:C:2011:125. See further, Gáspár-
Szilágyi (2015), pp. 343–370.
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extraordinary legal basis, a transitional provision for 2019,144 which in effect would 
have allowed the UK, and UK-based entities, to be treated as eligible for funding, 
provided that the UK had paid into the EU budget, on a monthly basis. This pro-
posal was not adopted, but it could be if ‘No Deal’ becomes politically more likely 
again, for instance in the run up to 31 October 2019. The obvious problem with such 
transitional measures is that they cannot deal with difficult broader decisions about 
the nature of the EU-UK relationship after Brexit, which will need to be determined 
before longer-term collaborative funding arrangements can be secured.
The European Data Protection Board’s February 2019 information note is con-
sistent with the position that the UK would have been treated as an ordinary ‘third 
country’ immediately on a No Deal Brexit: 
In the absence of an agreement between the EEA and the UK (No Deal Brexit), the UK will 
become a third country from 00.00 am CET on 30 March 2019. This means that the transfer 
of personal data to the UK has to be based on one of the following instruments as of 30 
March 2019:
 – Standard or ad hoc Data Protection Clauses
 – Binding Corporate Rules
 – Codes of Conduct and Certification Mechanisms
 – Derogations.145
Note that none of the listed bases of lawful transfer of personal data to the UK, 
in the event of No Deal Brexit, is that of an adequacy decision. It might be thought 
that this would have been the most convenient solution for all concerned, including 
EU-based biobanks which are networked with UK-based biobanks and wish to con-
tinue to share data. As noted above, in Sect. 4.1.3, the UK has affirmed that it will 
regard the EU’s data protection provision as adequate for the purposes of transfers 
of data to the EU. The GDPR provides that the Commission may decide that a third 
country, or one or more specified sectors in that third country (such as the biobank-
ing sector), ensures an adequate level of protection of personal data. Transfer of 
personal data from the EU to a country or sector within a country that is subject to 
such an adequacy decision is lawful under the GDPR without any further specific 
authorisation.146 The UK has become a ‘third country’, but its law, up until, the end 
of transition, was (at least presumptively) compliant with EU data protection law. 
Indeed, post-transition under the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, as amended by the EU 
(Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, the GDPR will become ‘retained EU law’, a 
part of the law of the UK. An adequacy decision seems the logical and practical 
approach.
144 Proposal for a Council Regulation on measures concerning the implementation and financing of 
the general budget of the Union in 2019 in relation to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from 
the Union COM/2019/64 final.
145 European Data Protection Board, Information note on data transfers under the GDPR in the 
event of a No Deal Brexit, 12 February 2019, https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/
edpb-2019-02-12-infonote-nodeal-brexit_en.pdf.
146 GDPR, Article 45 (1).
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 However, adequacy decisions are formal acts, taken by the Commission, assisted 
by a committee and according to a specified procedure,147 lasting for a period of up 
to 4 years, at which point they are reviewed.148 Although, on duly justified impera-
tive grounds of urgency, there is a power to adopt immediately applicable imple-
menting acts revoking or withdrawing adequacy decisions,149 there is no equivalent 
power to take an urgent adequacy decision. The GDPR sets the procedures through 
which adequacy decisions must be taken, and the EU institutions are not competent 
to depart from those procedures. To do so would have been ultra vires. Adequacy 
decisions are not suitable for the immediate legal ruptures implied by No Deal 
Brexit: to adopt an adequacy decision would be, in effect, to create a (partial) ‘Deal’, 
and would thus have undermined the EU’s negotiating position.
The CJEU has already found that aspects of UK data protection law are not com-
pliant with EU law obligations, although not in the context of biobanking.150 A 
January 2019 report from the UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights151 
noted that the Data Protection Act 2018 may not provide as comprehensive a protec-
tion as Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The onward transfer of 
data from the UK to countries outside the EU is also an area of contention.152
Furthermore, although the GDPR becomes ‘retained EU law’, as explained 
above, important changes to the GDPR are implemented by ministerial powers 
granted under the EU (Withdrawal) Act. Enforcement and remedial provisions also 
change: there will be no scope for dispute resolution within the European Data 
Protection Board, no obligation on UK courts to comply with rulings of the CJEU 
after the end of transition, and no jurisdiction of the CJEU to hear preliminary refer-
ences from the UK courts.
All of the above explains why the EU’s contingency planning for a No Deal 
Brexit did not include adopting an adequacy decision with respect to the UK. This 
may become salient again if the EU and UK trade agreement negotiations fail. EU 
Member States may not lawfully adopt unilateral adequacy decisions: the power to 
do so rests with the European Commission only.
According to Article 44 of the GDPR, in the absence of a formal adequacy deci-
sion taken by the European Commission, or other basis for the lawful transfer of 
personal data, all data flows from the EU to the UK would immediately be unlawful 
under the GDPR.153 If the EU does not take an adequacy decision to come into effect 
147 GDPR, Article 93 (2), Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, Article 5.
148 GDPR, Article 45 (3).
149 GDPR, Article 45 (5); Article 93(3).




153 GDPR, Article 44. See Mc Cullagh, Karen. UK: GDPR adaptions and preparations for with-
drawal from the EU. (n 51) at 119.
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at the end of the transitional period, biobanks seeking to lawfully transfer personal 
data to UK-based biobanks must therefore rely on alternative bases for that data 
transfer.
As noted above, these include binding corporate rules; standard contractual 
clauses; codes of conduct; and ‘special circumstances’. We were unable to locate 
examples of binding corporate rules in the context of biobanking which are in the 
public domain, or plans for adopting such rules in the event of No Deal Brexit, or no 
EU-UK free trade agreement at the end of transition. Several multinationals in the 
pharmaceutical and biomedical industry have successfully adopted such binding 
corporate rules.154 Given that this approach is more likely to be adopted by com-
mercial biobanks, it is not a surprise that such plans are not available for us to scru-
tinize. In general, they are costly and time-consuming to put in place.
The most likely mechanism for lawful data transfer from an EU Member State to 
a non-commercial biobank in the UK in the event of No Deal Brexit was on the 
basis of standard contractual clauses. Standard contractual clauses may be approved 
by the competent supervisory authority in any Member State, provided they comply 
with the conditions set out in the GDPR.155 In February 2010, the European 
Commission issued a template for standard contractual clauses (controller to pro-
cessor) under the Data Protection Directive.156 The GDPR provides that this tem-
plate remains in place until it is replaced under the GDPR’s new arrangements.157 
The Commission Decision provides that the template may not be varied, although 
further commercial clauses may be added. This inflexibility may present some dif-
ficulties for data transfer from the EU to a UK biobank. Further, this template will 
apply only where the data controller is in an EU Member State and the processor is 
in the UK. It will not apply in a situation where the UK-based biobank is the data 
controller and hosts personal data with an EU-based processor.
Most importantly, moreover, the status of standard contractual clauses as a basis 
for data transfer to third countries is currently the subject of litigation before the 
CJEU. This litigation process was not  completed before Exit Day, adding to the 
levels of uncertainty. Case C-311/18 Schrems II was referred to the CJEU for a pre-
liminary ruling by the Irish High Court on 9 May 2018. The AG Opinion was issued 
in December 2019, but the CJEU may not make its decision until after the end of 
transition.
154 See list at https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimension-data-
protection/binding-corporate-rules-bcr_en.
155 GDPR, Article 47.
156 Commission Decision 2010/87/EU of 5 February 2010 on standard contractual clauses for the 
transfer of personal data to processors established in third countries under Directive 95/46/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council OJ 2010 L 39/5–18; Amended to comply with Case 
C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner ECLI:EU:C:2015:650; 
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/2297 of 16 December 2016 amending Decisions 
2001/497/EC and 2010/87/EU on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to 
third countries and to processors established in such countries, under Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council OJ 2016 L 344/100–101.
157 GDPR, Article 94.
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One of the key questions of contention is the consistency of standard contractual 
clauses with the requirements under EU law for data subjects to access effective 
remedies for violations of their rights. An important element of standard contractual 
clauses as a basis for lawful data transfer under the GDPR is that the contract gives 
data subjects specific rights, even though the data subject is not a party to the con-
tract. Providing effective judicial remedies for private parties is a distinctive feature 
of EU law in general. These questions engage application of both the GDPR’s 
requirements and those of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Articles 7 (pri-
vacy); 8 (data protection) and 47 (right to an effective judicial remedy).
Here the UK’s amendments to the GDPR, as ‘retained EU law’, through the rel-
evant EU Exit Regulations, noted above in Sect. 4.1.3, are important. Will the UK 
arrangements for remedies and enforcement suffice to secure adequate protection 
from the point of view of the EU? Bear in mind, first, that the EU Exit Regulations 
remove all obligations on the UK, or entities within the UK, to cooperate within the 
structures of the EU, or to exchange information with the European Commission, 
including in matters of enforcement.
Further, and perhaps more seriously, the EU Exit Regulations,158 the amended 
Data Protection Act,159 and the European Union (Withdrawal) Act,160 all seek to 
prevent future developments of EU law that arise through interpretations of the 
CJEU becoming applicable in the UK. If Schrems II is decided after the end of tran-
sition, Exit Day, any principles of EU law deriving from that decision would not 
necessarily be applied in the UK, and data subjects in the UK would not necessarily 
be able to rely on those principles in seeking to remedy any breaches of their data 
protection rights.
In view of those concerns, it may be preferable for the biobanking sector to move 
expeditiously to adopt a sector-specific code of conduct for health research, and 
have this code approved under Article 40 of the GDPR. Such a code of conduct 
would provide a lawful basis for transfer of data to UK-based biobanks from the EU 
post-transition.
One final possibility is that EU-based biobanks transfer data to UK-based bio-
banks on the basis of ‘special circumstances’.161 This may be the most appropriate 
basis for lawful transfer following transition where data is being shared in the con-
text of an on-going clinical trial. A patient (data subject) already enrolled in that 
trial, and who perhaps cannot access any other licensed treatment for their condi-
tion, would need to secure continued data transfer to protect their ‘vital interests’. 
For pure research, it might be feasible to argue that ‘safeguarding legitimate inter-
ests of the data subject’ justifies continued sharing of data to the UK, at least in the 
context of an existing research project which may result in some benefit, however 
remote, for the data subjects concerned. UK Biobank certainly seems to believe that 
158 Regulation 5 (3).
159 DPA, section 205.
160 EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, section 4.
161 GDPR, Article 49.
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legitimate interests and the public interest are an appropriate basis for its data pro-
cessing, although whether it is sufficient for data transfer is unclear. There are also 
discussions regarding a possibility to rely on ‘public interest’ when collaborating 
with the US for transfers not covered under the EU’s adequacy decision for the US 
(the ‘privacy shield’).162
The position with regard to personal data that has already been transferred from 
the UK to the EU remains uncertain. By analogy with the revocation of an adequacy 
decision under Article 45 (5) GDPR, the effects of the UK leaving the EU on the 
lawfulness of the transfer of the data should not have retroactive effect. In practice, 
unless the European Data Protection Board or European Commission takes a deci-
sion applicable to the whole EU, it is likely to depend on the view adopted by the 
supervisory authority in the relevant EU Member State. Hence, it may be that data 
is processed by biobanks in the EU in a situation that is technically unlawful, or 
perhaps better described as a situation of ‘a-legality’,163 failure of the EU and UK to 
reach agreement on the matter.
4.3.2  The UK Position
The UK government’s position was to seek to secure as much continuity as possible 
in the event of No Deal Brexit, and presumably also a failure to reach agreement on 
a future trade relationship. For Horizon 2020 funding, the UK Chancellor announced 
in August and October 2016 that the UK government would guarantee funding for 
UK participants (but not for their EU collaborating partner organisations) in Horizon 
2020 projects in place before Exit Day. A further ministerial statement made to 
Parliament on 26 July 2018,164 and accompanied by a statement of liabilities in a 
departmental Minute laid before the UK House of Commons, assures UK organisa-
tions (which includes biobanks) that
The Treasury is also guaranteeing funding in event of a no deal for UK organisations which 
bid directly to the European Commission so that they can continue competing for, and 
securing, funding until the end of 2020. This ensures that UK organisations, such as chari-
ties, businesses and universities, will continue to receive funding over a project’s lifetime if 
they successfully bid into EU-funded programmes before December 2020.
The details of how this commitment would have been administered in practice in a 
No Deal Brexit situation, where funding is shared among consortia involving UK 
organisations and those in EU Member States,  were  far from clear, and the UK 
government has recognised that this was the case.165
162 See for example the work of Shabani and Borry (2018), pp. 149–156.
163 Hervey and Speakman (2018), pp. 65–109.
164 https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/writ-
ten-statement/Commons/2018-07-24/HCWS926/.
165 UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Guidance Horizon 2020 funding 
if there’s no deal 23 August 2018 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/horizon-
2020-funding-if-theres-no-brexit-deal/horizon-2020-funding-if-theres-no-brexit-deal%2D%2D2, 
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If the UK Clinical Research Collaboration’s Tissue Directory and Coordination 
Centre were excluded from BBMRI-ERIC and/or other EU funding and collabora-
tion arrangements, it may look to intensify other collaborations, for instance with 
projects in the USA, Russia and China. This approach would obviously only be 
legally viable if the sharing of data under such collaborations complies with the 
post-Brexit and post-transition UK regulatory provisions, as outlined above.
The UK government’s position under a No Deal Brexit was that there would be 
no immediate change to data protection law,166 and this presumably remains the case 
post-transition.  The EU (Withdrawal) Act and secondary legislation based on it, 
such as the Data Protection, Privacy and Electronic Communications (Amendments 
etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, discussed above, make no distinction between dif-
ferent types of Brexit. At the end of transition, the Data Protection Act 2018 would 
remains in place, and the GDPR changes from being EU law to being ‘retained EU 
law’. For data transfers from the UK to the EU, EEA and third countries deemed 
adequate by the EU at the end of transition, the UK has in effect taken an adequacy 
decision under the Data Protection, Privacy and Electronic Communications 
(Amendments etc) (EU Exit) (No. 2), Regulations 2019, schedule 2, article 102, 
inserting a new Schedule 21 into the UK GDPR.
The assertion that there would be no immediate change to data protection law is 
self-evidently not the case with regard to data transfer from the EU to the UK, as 
without an adequacy decision, or other basis on which data may lawfully be trans-
ferred to a UK-based entity, such as ‘appropriate safeguards’ (standard contractual 
clauses, a code of conduct, or binding corporate rules), or ‘special circumstances’, 
the EU will treat the UK as non-compliant with its data protection law. This is also 
the case for data transfer from other countries which currently rely on the UK’s 
membership of the EU to allow data transfer into the UK. As noted above, the con-
sequence for the activities of biobanks which rely on sharing of data with UK-based 
biobanks is that any continued sharing of data would potentially be unlawful. Given 
the difficulties with adequacy decisions, and the need for recognition from the EU, 
or a national competent authority in the EU, of standard contractual clauses, codes 
of conduct or binding corporate rules, this situation may be one in which the ‘spe-
cial circumstances’ provision of the GDPR may be tested.
However, even with regard to data protection law as applicable solely within the 
UK, a better description of the legal position is that there would be no immediate 
change to the content of data protection law (apart from the changes outlined in 
‘We are aware of some cases where UK participants lead a consortium and are responsible for 
distributing funding to the other participants; the UK government is seeking to discuss how this 
could best be addressed in a “no deal” scenario with the European Commission. These discussions 
would also need to include consideration of projects where the UK’s change in status from member 
state to third country could lead to concerns about ongoing compliance with Horizon 2020 rules 
(for example, where a consortium no longer meets the threshold for member state and/or associ-
ated country participants).’ Updated Guidance 3 December 2018 https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/the-governments-guarantee-for-eu-funded-programmes-if-theres-no-brexit-deal/
the-governments-guarantee-for-eu-funded-programmes-if-theres-no-brexit-deal.
166 Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sports, Data protection if there’s no Brexit deal. (n 89).
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Sect. 4.1.3 above), but that the source of data protection law would change. With 
this change of source, there may also be implications for the effects of the relevant 
law. Indeed, the UK government’s December 2018 guidance167 itself described the 
GDPR as ‘sitting alongside’ the Data Protection Act, which is a quite different to the 
pre-Brexit legal position to the effect that the GDPR is a source of supreme EU law.
5  Conclusion
Since the EU referendum vote in June 2016, despite the considerable uncertainties, 
many of which are outlined above, biobanks in the UK are adopting a ‘business as 
usual’ approach. For instance, UK Biobank continues to receive applications for 
and approve projects involving EU (and indeed international) partners, and as far as 
we have been able to ascertain, there is no falling away of the numbers of such proj-
ects being approved. For instance, in May 2019, UK Biobank approved a 5 year 
project with the Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne (EPFL), France, to 
explore diet/lifestyle/health factors as causes and modifiers of genetic determinants 
of healthspan, ageing and longevity.168 In April 2019, UK Biobank approved a year- 
long project with Sanofi, France, to support the eventual development of precision 
medicine.169 These are far from isolated examples.170 In 2018 and 2019, UK Biobank 
approved three projects from researchers based in the Netherlands; eight projects 
from researchers based in Sweden; a project from researchers based in Germany; 
and in June 2019 has approved a project from researchers based in Denmark.171
This ‘biobanking business as usual’ approach makes good sense. The UK has not 
left the EU, but  the Withdrawal Agreement was agreed, ratified and entered  into 
force, securing significant levels of continuity will be secured until the end of the 
transition period (currently until the end of December 2020). By contrast, under a 
No Deal Brexit, legal continuity was far from guaranteed, and this is the case at the 
end of transition too, although sharing of data with UK-based biobanks may be able 
to continue on the basis of appropriate safeguards, including possibly a code of 
conduct for biomedical research, or even perhaps a (temporary) adequacy decision. 
Given the uncertainty, inflexibility, cost and time investment that surrounds other 
types of appropriate safeguards, prompt moves towards a code of conduct, within 





170 This database is accessible here https://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/approved-research/.
171 The metabolic consequences of adverse early life conditions and subsequent risk for adult car-
diovascular disease and type 2 diabetes https://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/2019/06/the- 
metabolic-consequences-of-adverse-early-life-conditions-and-subsequent-risk-for-adult-cardio-
vascular-disease-and-type-2-diabetes/.
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the context of BBMRI-ERIC, would offer timely reassurance to the biobanking sec-
tor, both within the UK and on a European and international level, given the ways in 
which UK biobanks are nested within European and global networks.
At this time (June 2020), it is still not possible to predict what the relationship 
will be between the UK and the EU in the future, for data transfer, in the biobanking 
sector and beyond. The political declaration setting out a framework for the future 
relationship between the EU and the UK,172 issued at the same time as the draft 
Withdrawal Agreement, gives a prominent place to data protection.173 The declara-
tion states that the EU will begin the process of adopting an adequacy decision for 
transfer of data to the UK, as a ‘third country’, ‘as soon as possible after the UK’s 
withdrawal’. The UK will reciprocate. The EU and UK should also ‘make arrange-
ments for appropriate cooperation between regulators’. Of course, this is a political 
commitment only, and not legally binding on the EU or the UK. Yet, at least at the 
time it was promulgated, the intention to secure continuity was present, even if the 
precise legal modalities of how to do so were distinctly elusive. 
All that said, given that prominent biobanks in the UK are continuing to collabo-
rate internationally, it seems likely that such collaborations and data transfer will 
also continue both in to the UK and outwardly to the EU, in one way or another. 
Nevertheless, the chilling effect of the uncertain legal basis on which future collabo-
rations involving data transfer will take place, is undoubtedly having implications 
for the biobanking sector in the UK.
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